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State v. Sargent, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 18 (February 23, 2006)1 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – PRELIMINARY HEARINGS & 
PERSONAL APPEARANCES 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court decided whether justice courts have jurisdiction to order a defendant to 
personally appear at a preliminary hearing when the defendant has filed a waiver of 
personal appearance and counsel has appeared on his behalf. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court held that the justice courts do not have the jurisdictional power to order 
a defendant to personally appear at a preliminary hearing when the defendant has filed a 
waiver of personal appearance and has appeared through counsel. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
  
 Defendant Sargent was charged with indecent exposure2 for allegedly 
masturbating in front of a woman at a Reno car wash.  At the preliminary hearing, 
Sargent’s counsel appeared and filed a waiver of personal appearance on the defendant’s 
behalf.  The State opposed going forward with the preliminary hearing because the 
defendant’s absence prevented the State’s witness from identifying Sargent in court as the 
individual who exposed himself.  Sargent’s counsel replied that identification was a 
contested issue in this case because the description the witness had given did not match 
the defendant.  Sargent’s counsel argued that under NRS 178.388 the defendant is only 
required appear at arraignment, trial, and sentencing.  The justice of the peace sided with 
the state, ruling that NRS 178.388 required the defendant to appear at the preliminary 
hearing, and ordered Sargent to appear at a rescheduled preliminary hearing. 
 Sargent petitioned the district court for a writ of certiorari.  The district court 
granted certiorari and ordered the case transferred to the district court.  The district court 
ruled that the justice court lacked authority to order a criminal defendant to appear at the 
preliminary hearing.  Accordingly, the district court ordered the justice court to vacate its 
order requiring Sargent to personally appear at the preliminary hearing.  The State 
appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
Determining whether a justice court may require a criminal defendant to 
personally appear at a preliminary hearing when he has waived personal appearance and 
counsel appears on his behalf is a matter of statutory construction.  The Nevada Supreme 
Court applies two principles of statutory interpretation to construe the relevant Nevada 
                                                 
1 By Michael Pandullo 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.220 (2005). 
statutes.  First, the Court attributes plain meaning to statutory language3 unless the 
legislature clearly intended some other meaning.4  Second, the Court assumes that no 
statutory language is meaningless.5 
NRS 178.388 requires that the defendant personally appear at arraignment, trial, 
and sentencing, but does not refer to preliminary hearing.  The statute also allows the 
defendant to waive personal appearance in limited circumstances.  The State conceded 
that the language of NRS 178.388 did not require the defendant to personally appear at a 
preliminary hearing, but argued that a defendant’s right to waive appearance is different 
from the defendant’s independent obligation to appear under certain circumstances.  The 
Court rejected this argument.  
Nevada justice courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,6 and therefore have only 
the authority expressly granted to them by statute7 as well as the limited inherent 
authority to execute their statutory authority.8  NRS 171.196 grants the justice courts 
authority to conduct preliminary hearings.  Because the legislature explicitly specified in 
NRS 178.388 the proceedings for which a defendant must personally appear, the Court 
declined to infer that the defendant must appear for any additional proceedings unless the 
defendant’s absence would prevent the justice court from conducting those proceedings.  
For instance, the Court noted that if a defendant did not retain counsel, he would have to 
personally appear at the preliminary hearing. 
The State argued that the defendant’s presence was necessary because (1) the 
State should be able to choose to prove the alleged perpetrator’s identity through in-court 
eyewitness identification; and (2) justice courts must have the inherent authority to 
compel personal appearance or else they could not hold preliminary hearings and bind 
defendants over for trial.  The Court rejected these arguments, noting that there are other 
ways for the state to prove identity at a preliminary hearing, including photographic 
evidence or a police line-up.  Additionally, the Court held that the State’s chosen method 
of identification could not create the justice court’s inherent authority to compel the 
defendant’s personal appearance.  Moreover, the Court held that when a defendant retains 
counsel to appear on his behalf at a preliminary hearing and waives personal appearance, 
as Sargent did here, the defendant’s lack of personal appearance does not prevent the 
justice court from exercising its judicial function. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court concluded that the justice courts do not have the authority to order a 
defendant to personally appear at a preliminary hearing when the defendant files a waiver 
of personal appearance and retains counsel to appear on his behalf.  As such, the Court 
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held that the district court did not err by ordering the justice court to vacate its order 
requiring Sargent to appear. 
